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       Abstract 
This analysis aims to set out clearly and succinctly the legal arrangements for macro-economic governance 
in EMU, legal challenges to that regime and different ways of assessing that new regime. It focuses on 
changes introduced from 2010, the year when the euro area crisis, and the response to it, began, and on 
changes to the law other than those concerning provision of sovereign debt loan assistance. The analysis 
first presents the (many) key EMU acronyms before outlining in four diagrams what is new in EMU by 
looking at what changes have been made since 2010. It outlines what further proposals in this area are 
included in the Five Presidents’ Report of June 2015. It then briefly examines three central legal challenges 
with the current regime: competence, compatibility and complexity. Finally it raises issues of the 
effectiveness of the EU macro-economic governance regime by considering three assessments: too early 
to say, abject failure or triumph of pragmatic intelligence. These raise questions of optimal policy design.  
The four diagrams accordingly provide the foundation for understanding the current regime, further 
proposed changes, legal challenges and issues of effectiveness. 
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1. What’s new in EMU 
 
A. Already in place 
 
Changes to the Economic component of EMU have been introduced in three main waves since 
2010, in the Six-Pack (of 5 Regulations and 1 Directive) of 2011, in the Fiscal Compact Treaty 
of March 2 2012 and in the Two-Pack (of 2 Regulations) of May 2013. 
 
Reconstructing the sources in this area, with a view to highlighting the crisis innovations, is a 
formidable task. It is approached here by starting from the EU Treaty sources underpinning 
the two key pillars of EU macro-economic governance, economic policy co-ordination in 
Article 121 TFEU and fiscal discipline in Article 126 TFEU. As the EU has no inherent 
competence to act, it must be able to point to a provision in the EU treaties allowing it to act. 
That Treaty basis will also give details of how it is allowed to act. To respect the EU’s limited 
competences the action taken should fall fully within the legal basis. Up until the crisis, 
preventive fiscal discipline and economic policy co-ordination have been dealt with under 
Article 121 TFEU while corrective fiscal discipline – the Excessive Deficit Procedure – was dealt 
with in Article 126 TFEU and Protocol 12 to the EU Treaties. A new legal basis was added by 
the Lisbon Treaties, Article 136 TFEU, for euro area states only. Articles 121, 126 and 136 
constitute the Treaty bases upon which the Economic component in EMU is further 
constructed after the onset of crisis in 2010. In four diagrams below I show how the Economic 
component of EMU has been dramatically expanded and deepened during the crisis, and how 
that has entailed different combinations of Treaty bases. Pre-crisis provisions are in black, new 
EMU is in blue. A few additional ‘explainer’ tables are in green. These diagrams also lay the 
ground for understanding why the new provisions raise competence, compatibility and 
complexity challenges, discussed in the second part of this brief. The diagrams can also be 
used to pin-point and explore issues of policy (in)effectiveness of the Economic component of 
EMU, the concluding part of this analysis. 
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  The Economic in EMU acronyms 
 
SGP = Stability and Growth Pact (a cluster of instruments introduced in 1997 and subsequently 
revised in 2005 and 2011. The most important are Regulation 1466/97 on Preventive Fiscal 
Discipline and Regulation 1467/97 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.) 
MTO = Medium-Term Budgetary Objective. This is the key concept underpinning the preventive 
arm of fiscal discipline. 
BEPGs = Broad Economic Policy Guidelines = the original focus of economic co-ordination, still part 
of the European Semester. 
MIP = Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure 
IDR = In-Depth Report (stage in the MIP) 
CAP = Corrective Action Plan (stage in the MIP) 
EIP = Excessive Imbalance Procedure (stage in the MIP) 
EDP = Excessive Deficit Procedure 
ED = Excessive Deficit 
EPP = Economic Partnership Programme (new regime for excessive deficit states) 
MAP = Macro-Economic Adjustment Programme (regime for euro-states receiving sovereign debt 
loan assistance) 
PPS = Post-Programme Surveillance (regime for states which have exited sovereign debt loan 
assistance but have not yet repaid 75% of the loan) 
DEC = decision by Council 
REC = Recommendation (by Commission or Council) 
QM or QMV = Qualified Majority Voting by Council on a measure. The measure will be adopted only 
if a qualified majority of states are in favour. 
R-QMV = Reverse Qualified Majority Voting by Council. The measure will be adopted unless a 
qualified majority of states are not in favour. 
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Diagram 1     THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE (EDP) UNDER ARTICLE 126 TFEU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 126  TFEU 
6. Council decides on existence 
of ED 
7. Where ED exists, Council 
shall adopt RECommendations 
8. Where no effective action, 
can make REC PUBLIC 
9. Council may adopt DECision 
10. No ED infringement actions  
11. Council may apply 
sanctions including non-interest 
bearing deposits/fines 
12. Abrogation of DEC/RECS 
when ED corrected 
13. Adoption of DEC/REC by 
QM  
14. legal basis for additional 
EDP measures 
SGP 1467/97 
126.6 DEC on ED existence 
and 126.7 REC simultaneous 
126.7 Max deadline = 6 mths  
REC can be revised if 
unexpected econ events with 
major consequences for the MS  
126.9 Any DECwithin two  
months of 126.8 
Min annual improvement 
benchmark of 0,5% GDP 
126.11 Where conditions met 
Council SHALL apply 
sanctions 
EXPLAINER 
Why was there no combined 
use of Article 126 and 136 for 
the additional euro-area 
measures concerning the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure? 
 
Because Article 136 TFEU 
excludes the use of the EDP 
legal procedure in Article 
126.14 
 
This explains why Articles 
121/136 were used instead, see 
Diagram 3. 
 
The new regulation of national 
budgetary frameworks was 
done using all three Treaty 
legal bases, see Diagram 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVISED SGP 1467/97 
• Making operational debt 
criterion in EDP – will be 
considered sufficiently 
diminishing if differential with 
60% reference value has 
decreased at average rate of 
1/20th pa over previous 3 
years. 
• 126.7 deadline may be 3 mths 
when warranted by 
seriousness of situation. 126.7 
public progress report by MS. 
REC can be revised if major 
events in EU as a whole. 
• 126.9  MS to make public 
progress report. Council DEC 
shall indicate measures 
conducive to reaching targets. 
• 126.11 A fine [before interest-
bearing deposit] shall as a rule 
be required. Fines to ESM 
[before to states without EDs] 
• Enhanced surveillance, 
including Commission on-site 
monitoring for States in 126.8 
to 126.11. 
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Diagram 2      ECONOMIC CO-ORDINATION AND SURVEILLANCE UNDER ARTICLE 121 TFEU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 121 TFEU 
Broad Economic 
Policy 
Guidelines 
Preventive 
Budget 
Discipline 
SGP 1466/97 
Macro-Economic Imbalance 
Procedure 
6-Pack 1176/2011 
 
Scoreboard macro-econ 
indicators . Can trigger ALERT 
mechanism. If so In-Depth 
Report 
MI = Recommendations 
Severe MI = initiate Excessive 
Imbalance Plan – Council REC – 
MS Corrective Action Plan 
(CAP) 
Non-compliance with CAP 
found by Council DEC taken by 
R-QMV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6-Pack 1175/2011 
• More specification of what is to be 
included in stability/convergence 
programmes 
• MS forecast to be compared with 
Commission’s: reasoned explanation 
of significant differences 
• Benchmark of 0.5% GDP adjustment 
path towards MTO increased if debt > 
60% 
• More reasons for temporary deviation 
beyond major structural reform 
eg unusual event outside controlof MS  
eg severe econ downturn for euroarea/EU as a 
whole provided does not endanger medium 
term fiscal sustainability  
• expenditure benchmark 
EUROPEAN SEMESTER (with Employment Guidelines under 148(2) TFEU) 
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Diagram 3     NEW OBLIGATIONS AND REGIMES FOR EURO AREA STATES ONLY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Article 121 TFEU 
Article 136 TFEU 
ie euro states only 
MIP 
Sanctions 
6-Pack 1174/2011 
 
Non compliance with 
CAP or repeated failure to  
draw it up 
Interest-bearing 
deposit/fine 
RQMV/0.1% GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREVENTIVE BUDGET 
DISCIPLINE 
6-Pack 1173/2011 
Sanctions for failure to respond to 
Council REC under SGP 1466/97: 
interest bearing deposit of 0,2% GDP to 
be adopted by R-QMV 
 
Council can fine MS for stat 
manipulation: intentional or seriously 
negligent misrepresentation of 
deficit/debt data for Art 121/126. 
Commission power to investigate/MS 
due process rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enhanced surveillance 
regime 
2-Pack 472/2013 Macro-economic 
Adjustment Programme 
2-Pack 472/2013 
 
EDP 
SANCTIONS EARLIER 
6-Pack 1173/2011 
126.6 Where ED in MS which has had sanctions 
imposed under preventive budgetary procedure, 
or Commission finds particularly serious non-
compliance Council shall  by R-QMV DEC 
require non-interest bearing deposit of 0,2% 
GDP. 
126.8 Fine of 0,2% GDP by Council DEC under 
R-QMV. 
 
2-Pack 473/2013 
Closer monitoring of EDP MSS 
Report every 6 mths under 126.7, every 3 
under 126.9 
 
Commission REC power if MS risks not 
correcting ED by Council deadline 
 
Econ Part Prog for MS at 126.6 and beyond: 
combine fiscal measures and structural reforms. 
Council can adopt Opinion on EPP. 
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Diagram 4 NATIONAL BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS - A KEY NEW FOCUS OF EU MACRO-ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 126 
TFEU 
Article 121 TFEU 
    Article 136 TFEU 
     Euro-states only 
Six Pack Directive on budgetary 
frameworks 2011/85 
 
Defines and requires: 
Robust public accounting and fiscal 
data 
 
Macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts 
 
Country-specific numerical fiscal 
rules promoting compliance with 
deficit/debt/MTO [UK excluded] 
 
Compliance to be monitored by 
bodies independent of national 
fiscal authorities [UK excluded] 
 
Medium-term budgetary 
frameworks providing for a fiscal 
planning horizon of at least 3 years 
 
 
 
2-Pack 473/2013 
 
Common budgetary time-line 
April : Medium term fiscal plan 
By 15 October draft budget of MSS to be made public 
By 30 November Commission opinion on draft 
budgets 
By 31 December adoption of budget 
 
Specifying what the budget should contain (Art 6) 
 
Power for Commission to ask for draft budget to be 
amended –where it identifies particularly serious non-
compliance with SGP budgetary obligations (Art 7) 
 
Ex ante reporting on public debt issuance plans 
 
Independent fiscal bodies beefed up: given task of 
monitoring compliance with other numerical fiscal 
rules esp MTO, empowered to give public 
assessments to correction mechanism for MTO 
deviation, temporary deviations from MTO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Compact Treaty 
All EUstates but UK and 
Czech Republic 
 
National BB rule of binding 
force and permanent 
character, preferably 
constitutional. 
 
Ex ante reporting on public 
debt issuance plans 
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As a result of the crisis changes to the Economic in EMU, a range of different macro-economic 
statuses are now possible for Member States. Pre-2010, the only clear status was to be a State 
with an Excessive Deficit. The crisis legislation adds the following four new possibilities, most 
of which apply only to euro area states: 
 
• Macro-Economic Adjustment Programme States: euro area only 
• Enhanced Surveillance States: euro area only 
- All those with precautionary basis financial assistance 
- Others Commission decides have or at are risk of having serious difficulties with 
financial stability 
• Economic Partnership Programme States (a new regime for excessive deficit states): 
euro area only 
• Post-Programme Surveillance States 
 
B. Five Presidents’ Report of June 22 2015 and its follow-up 
 
The Five Presidents’ Report sets out a road-map by the heads of the EU institutions for EMU. 
What does it propose to add to the Economic regime of EMU as set out in the four diagrams 
above? In the short-term (2015-2017), and using the existing Treaty framework, the following 
changes are proposed.  
 
European Semester 
• Adding a euro area system of national independent competitiveness authorities to 
oversee the European Semester. Their mandate could include assessing ‘whether 
wages are evolving in line with productivity’ and to assess progress made with 
economic reforms to enhance competitiveness more generally. A Commission 
Recommendation of October 2015 (COM (2016) 127 final) for the Council to adopt a 
Recommendation to this end was not given a warm reception at the Competitiveness 
Council of 30 November 2015 at which ‘A large number of delegations expressed 
concerns that these would create additional burdens and delays in decision-making.’  
 
• Simplification and strengthening. Clear, concrete and ambitious recommendations (in 
content and timeframe) should be set. However the Report states that they should 
remain ‘political’ (rather than, it is to be supposed, ‘legal’) obligations leaving Member 
States a degree of freedom regarding the exact measures to be implemented. A multi-
annual timeframe should be accepted for some reforms. Accountability should be 
stepped up via reporting, peer-review, comply or explain methods and best practice 
identification. There should be clear delineation of a Euro-area stage followed by a 
national stage. 
 
MIP 
• The MIP should be used not just for detecting imbalances but to encourage structural 
reform. It should also capture imbalances in the euro-area as a whole rather than in 
individual Member States. Its corrective arm should be used forcefully (though note 
that there is no legal obstacle to this in the existing framework). 
 
Budgetary governance 
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• The forthcoming review of the 6- and 2-Packs is said by the Report to provide an 
opportunity to improve clarity and transparency of ‘admittedly complex’ rules as well 
as compliance and legitimacy, while preserving their stability-oriented nature. 
• Its decision to create an advisory European Fiscal Board to co-ordinate and 
complement the national fiscal councils has already been put into effect by a 
Commission Decision in October 2015 ([2015] OJ L 282/37). Its five members shall 
provide a public and independent assessment, at European level, of how budget 
execution performs against the requirements of the EU budgetary governance 
framework.  
 
Other priorities are mentioned but the accompanying proposals for their policy realisation are 
projected for the medium term, and to be preceded by a White Paper in Spring 2017:  
 
• Formalising convergence by making it more binding. The most worked through 
example concerns reforming labour markets and social protection systems. This 
includes the policy objectives of getting the unemployed back to work, reducing the 
insider/outsider divide by focusing on those with high protection and wages, finding 
the right balance between flexible and secure labour contracts, ensuring a social 
protection floor for the most vulnerable and making pension and health systems 
sustainable through major reforms. Common high-level ‘flexicurity’ standards would 
be defined in EU legislation. 
• Making access to a planned euro-area stabilisation function/fund subject to 
compliance with the Economic regime of EMU.  
 
2. Legal challenges of the new Economic regime of EMU regime: Competence, 
Compatibility, Complexity 
 
A. Competence: Mind the Gaps! 
 
As noted at the beginning, the EU operates under the principle of conferral; it can only act in 
the way the EU Treaties give it the power to act. When it acts outside its competences, those 
legal acts are vulnerable to being challenged and can be found to be invalid for that reason by 
the Court of Justice. This will depend on how the Court of Justice interprets the competence 
granted in the event of a legal challenge. 
 
These competence issues are very present in EMU. It is clear from the diagrams above that 
the Treaties provide for three central legal bases for the Economic regime of EMU: Articles 
121, 126 and 136. Yet these do not clearly permit many of the new measures adopted. There 
are two main problems. One concerns whether the EU law-maker is permitted to adopt the 
substance of the measure. Are, for example, macro-economic imbalances covered by the legal 
basis in Article 121 TFEU? The other, even more central in considering the new regime, is the 
procedure and measures permitted. If the Treaty only permits Recommendations (a non-
legally binding EU measure) against Member States agreed by QMV, but the legislation 
provides for legally-binding Decisions against Member States agreed by R-QMV, that raises 
competence problems. An interesting feature of EMU is that competence problems or doubts 
have in fact been present from the 1997 SGP onwards. However, these doubts increase 
9 
 
dramatically in light of the changes introduced after 2010. I illustrate this further by briefly 
looking at each of the diagrams from a competence perspective. 
 
Article 126 
Diagram 1 illustrates nicely how the detailed steps laid down by the Treaty had already been 
‘built upon’ or ‘departed from’ by the SGP before the crisis, but more so afterwards. One 
example suffices. The Treaty provides (126.11) that sanctions may be applied by the Council. 
The SGP pre-crisis provided that the Council shall apply sanctions but left the choice of 
sanction to the Council. The SGP post-crisis provides that fines shall as a rule be required. So 
there is a significant move from the Council’s freedom under the Treaty to apply sanctions as 
and when it sees fit to requiring it to apply a pre-defined sanction. 
 
Article 121 
What does Article 121 TFEU authorise the EU to do? It provides that the Council shall 
formulate broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) for the Member States and monitor and 
assess economic developments on that basis. Where Member States are out of line with these 
or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU, a series of EU actions can be taken. These 
are a Commission warning and a Recommendation from the Council which it can decide to 
make public.  
 
Let us apply this to the Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure introduced in 2011. In terms of 
substance, the MIP with its Preventive and Corrective arms mirrors more closely the EDP than 
the BEPGs. Nonetheless, this might still be seen as economic policy co-ordination to prevent 
jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU. In terms of procedure, however, the match with 
its legal basis is much less secure. Specifically, as shown in Diagram 2, the MIP empowers the 
Council to take a Decision by R-QMV on non-compliance with the corrective arm of the 
procedure. Yet Article 121 includes only the possibility for the Council to adopt 
Recommendations by QMV.   
 
Article 121 and 136 
Excessive Deficit 
We have seen that the Treaty basis for extra euro-area measures (Article 136) does not allow 
euro area only measures to be adopted under the EDP legal basis in Article 126. One could 
conclude from this that no euro area only measures on the EDP can lawfully be adopted. 
Instead, as Diagram 3 shows, the EU law-makers decided to go ahead and adopt extensive 
further Excessive Deficit measures for euro-area states only by using Article 121 TFEU as the 
accompanying legal basis.   
 
New sanctions for preventive fiscal discipline, excessive deficit and macro-economic 
imbalances 
Diagram 3 clearly shows that new sanctions are the most central feature of the new measures 
adopted for euro-area states only. Sanctions are introduced for the first time into the 
preventive arm of fiscal discipline, moved earlier in the EDP, and sanctions – interest-bearing 
deposits or fines – are also introduced for non-compliance with the corrective arm of the MIP. 
All sanctions are subject to R-QMV. We have already seen that Article 121 does not provide 
the basis for such sanctions or the procedure for their adoption. Does Article 136 fill the gap? 
Unpromisingly for those who wish to argue that it does, it says that the Council shall adopt 
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measures, ‘following the relevant procedure from among those referred in Articles 121 and 
126’. However, it goes on to say they can adopt ‘measures’ ‘to strengthen the coordination 
and surveillance of their fiscal discipline’ which could be seen as authorisation to adopt a wider 
range of measures, including sanctions. It refers to QM voting by Council on any such 
measures. At the very least, a broad purpose-oriented interpretation of Article 136 would be 
required to bridge the competence gaps.  
 
Article 121, 126 and 136: the national budgetary frameworks 
The links between the Treaty bases and the extensive framework of national budgetary 
governance introduced since 2010 are not self-evident. Perhaps the creation of independent 
fiscal bodies in each Member to monitor compliance with a range of EU-determined country 
specific numerical fiscal rules is the strongest evidence of how far these Treaty bases have 
been extensively interpreted. 
 
Solving Competence Problems 
It might be argued, albeit not very convincingly, that Articles 121, 126 and 136 form an 
integrated package and therefore one treaty basis is as good as another. Or, as the MIP 
Regulation states, that Decisions are an ‘integral follow-up’ to the Recommendations 
permitted under Article 121. Or, again not very convincingly, that R-QMV is simply a variant 
of QMV, rather than a significant shift in the EU institutional balance towards the Commission 
and away from the Council.  
 
The most sure-fire way to solve competence problems is evidently to amend the Treaty. 
However, this presents problems of its own. It is typically very difficult to successfully amend 
the Treaties. The need for unanimous agreement also means that opening up negotiations on 
EMU can lead to bargaining for concessions on other non-EMU issues. Hence the efforts to 
amend the EU Treaties in 2011 to include a balanced budget rule led to the UK demanding 
concessions in unrelated areas. To avoid making these concessions, ultimately a non-EU 
Treaty, the Fiscal Compact treaty, was agreed and ratified by 25 EU States. Furthermore, it 
may be felt that amending the Treaties leads to an overly rigid structure for the Economic 
component of EMU. Legislation is easier to amend and is thus a better vehicle for adapting 
macro-economic governance to changing circumstances.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, no competence challenge to the Economic component 
of EMU package has to date emerged; this is the practical resolution of this issue so far. In this 
respect, there is a sharp contrast between the competence issues raised by the extensive 
reforms to the Economic component of EMU and the high-profile challenges to loan assistance 
mechanisms (the ESM challenged in Pringle (C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756) and exceptional 
ECB measures during the crisis (the OMT challenged in Gauweiler (C-62/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400)).    
 
B. Compatibility with binding EU Social Europe commitments  
 
One striking feature of the new EMU is the incredibly detailed instructions given to Member 
States about how they should manage their national social, employment and industrial 
relations systems. Yet such instructions can create sharp tensions with other EU Treaty 
commitments, including commitments to respect fundamental rights in the EU Charter. Let us 
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take the Recommendation issued to France in July 2015 under the European Semester (for 
which see Diagram 2). It recommends, for instance, that: 
 
• Sizeable short-term savings cannot be achieved without curbing significantly the increase in social 
security spending, which represented 26% of GDP in 2014…Healthcare expenditure savings of EUR 11 
billion are planned for 2015-2017, but further efforts are needed to limit expenditure increases in this 
area. In particular, there is scope to implement further cost-containment policies in the area of 
pharmaceutical prices and hospital spending.  
• The minimum wage should evolve in a manner that is more conducive for competitiveness and job 
creation. In addition, in a context of low inflation, its automatic indexation may lead to wage increases 
beyond what is necessary to preserve purchasing power. 
• France should take decisive action to remove the regulatory thresholds in labour law …that limit the 
growth of French firms, in particular SMEs. 
• Reform labour law to provide more incentives for employers to hire on open-ended contracts. Facilitate 
take up of derogations at company and branch level from general legal provisions, in particular as 
regards working time arrangements. Reform the law creating the accords de maintien de l’emploi by the 
end of 2015 in order to increase their take-up by companies. Take action in consultation with the social 
partners and in accordance with national practices to reform the unemployment benefit system in order 
to bring the system back to budget sustainability and provide more incentives to return to work. 
 
Contrast those Recommendations with the very substantial set of binding EU commitments 
to Social Europe. A good start is the EU Treaty commitment to ‘a social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress….[it] shall promote social justice and 
protection’ (Article 3(3) TEU). Article 9 TFEU provides that, ‘In defining and implementing its 
policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion 
of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against 
social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health’. 
Article 152 TFEU provides that ‘The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social 
partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate 
dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy’. 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has the same legal value as the Treaties, 
contains numerous relevant rights and principles. The ‘Solidarity’ part of the Charter is the 
most relevant. Article 28 guarantees workers and employers ‘the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels’. Article 30 gives protection in the 
event of unjustified dismissal while Article 31 provides that ‘every worker has the right to 
working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity’. Young people at work 
are protected (Article 32). The right to social security and social, including housing, assistance 
is recognised and respected ‘so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient 
resources’ (Article 34). Health and education are also protected so that ‘A high level of health 
protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies 
and activities’ (Article 35) and there is the right to receive free compulsory education and to 
have access to vocational and continuing training (Article 14). 
 
Solving Compatibility Problems 
Many of the new EMU provisions contain what might be called social rights prophylactics to 
try to resolve these economic-social compatibility issues. The MIP Regulation (see Diagram 2) 
accordingly provides that: 
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The application of this Regulation shall fully observe Article 152 TFEU, and the Recommendations issued under 
this Regulation shall respect national practices and institutions for wage formation. This Regulation takes into 
account Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and accordingly does not affect the right to negotiate, 
conclude or enforce collective agreements or to take collective action in accordance with national law and 
practice (Article 1(3)).  
 
Yet provisions such as these may not be legally convincing particularly if non-EU human rights 
bodies or national constitutional courts find that the measures in which they are embedded 
breach fundamental rights.  
 
Moreover, beyond legal compatibility, there is the broader legitimacy issue of EMU shifting 
the substance of EU policies away from safeguarding certain social entitlements and 
institutions as well as the economic security of those in the EU. The need to respond to such 
concerns is reflected in commitments to achieving a ‘Social Triple-A’ in the 5 Presidents’ 
Report and the announcement of Commission President Juncker in his State of the Union 
speech to the European Parliament on 9 September 2015 that: 
 
“… I will want to develop a European Pillar of Social Rights, which takes account of the changing realities of 
Europe's societies and the world of work. And which can serve as a compass for the renewed convergence within 
the euro area. The European Pillar of Social Rights should complement what we have already jointly achieved 
when it comes to the protection of workers in the EU. I will expect social partners to play a central role in this 
process. I believe we do well to start with this initiative within the euro area, while allowing other EU Member 
States to join in if they want to do so.”   
 
Consultation on the European Pillar of Social Rights began on 8 March 2016 (Commission 
Communication COM (2016) 127 final). The consultation documents envisage production of 
‘principles’ drawing on existing EU Charter and Treaty social commitments in three umbrella 
areas of equal opportunities and access to labour markets; fair working conditions; and 
adequate and sustainable social protection. These principles would, the consultation suggests, 
serve as a reference point to drive convergence of euro area states, and other voluntary 
participants, employment and social policies. At the same time the social acquis will be 
reviewed in light of this pillar. 
 
Initiatives such as these will ring hollow if the evidence of EU actions and their impacts point, 
as they have done during the crisis to date, away from protecting and enhancing social rights 
and economic security for individuals living and working in the EU. It is worth stressing, 
however, that these issues are much more sharply legally defined for countries required to 
comply with social loan conditions to obtain sovereign debt loan assistance. Unlike those loan 
conditions, much of the output of the Economic regime of EMU is non-binding. This makes it 
more difficult to envisage a successful legal challenge. Hence the Court of Justice recently 
rejected a challenge to a 2012 change to Spanish employment law on the basis that it 
breached Article 30 EUCFR. The Spanish Court’s suggestion that the Spanish employment law 
was covered by the Charter because it ‘implemented’ the European Semester was rejected 
because the latter ‘does not impose any specific obligation with respect to probationary 
periods in employment contracts’ (C-117/14, Nisttahuz Poclava, judgment of 5 February 
2015).  
 
C. Complexity 
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My efforts to simplify into four diagrams the genesis and legal organisation of the Economic 
component of EMU cannot disguise one of the main features of this body of law: its 
complexity. Indeed, this is the primary concern with this area identified by the European 
Commission in its November 2014 review of the 6 and 2-Packs (COM/2014/0905 final). It 
states: 
 
The relationships between the various instruments of economic surveillance are complex and limit the 
transparency of policy-making, which in turn poses challenges for its implementation, for communication with 
stake-holders and the general public and consequently for ownership, democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
 
As noted above, this complexity is also noted in the 5 Presidents’ Report as an issue to be 
addressed by a further review of the 6 and 2-Packs which is envisaged in the Commission Work 
Programme for 2016 (COM(2015)610 final). It seems likely that any proposals emerging will 
not entail legislative change but rather more communication with Parliaments (EP and 
national) and more efforts to explain and present clearly the Economic component of EMU. 
 
3. Issues of Effectiveness: too early to say, abject failure or triumph of 
pragmatic intelligence? 
 
No sanctions under the entire Economic regime of EMU outlined in this policy brief have ever 
been applied. Despite the many excessive deficits, and the instruction in the SGP from 1997 
that the Council shall impose sanctions, it has never happened. Although the Commission in 
2013 and 2014 identified excessive imbalances under the new MIP on five occasions, it did not 
submit a proposal for their formal establishment by the Council so the procedure was not 
triggered. The multiplication and intensification of sanctions from 2010 onwards has to date 
made absolutely no difference. How can this be interpreted? 
 
It may be, as the Commission asserts in its November 2014 Review, that it is simply too early 
to say. Indeed, it is important to carefully track the ongoing use of the new extensive array of 
powers and procedures introduced since 2010 to see which are used and in what 
circumstances.  
 
An alternative reading is that EMU’s economic component has never worked properly and 
that the changes wrought since 2010 are not going to make any difference: the gap between 
the law on the books and its real-life application could hardly be wider than in this area. 
Germany and France, when faced with entering into the sanctions phase of the EDP early in 
the millennium, famously placed the procedure in abeyance, leading to litigation before the 
Court of Justice (C-27/04, Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-6649), and a revamping, for some 
a dilution, of the SGP in 2005. On this reading, the interests of states in their budgetary and 
macro-economic policies are simply too strong, or too complex, to make compliance with the 
Economic regime in EMU prevail over them. Compliance is therefore largely coincidental. 
There may also be objections to the soundness of the rules themselves: is it really an 
overriding priority for States to reduce public debt below 60% GDP? When compliance would 
entail what the state regards as undesired fiscal or economic effects, and is not seen as a 
sufficiently compelling good in its own right, non-compliance will be chosen. On a 
straightforward reading of the Economic component in EMU, this would make the new legal 
framework an abject failure. When states breach clear rules with apparent impunity, the 
solution is not to create more rules and more intense, yet still unapplied, sanctions. Yet this is 
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what has happened since 2010. The shift to R-QMV in the Council has not had the effect of 
pushing enforcement forwards but rather the effect that the Commission does not propose 
enforcement measures to the Council.  
 
Yet there is a further possible reading of the new EMU. Despite sanctions not being applied, 
on this argument, it is reductive to say that the Economic component of EMU is an abject 
failure. The Economic regime of EMU is not best understood as a crime-punishment system 
although the sanctions, and the supposed automaticity leading to their imposition implied via 
timelines, imposing obligations to act on the Council and the shift to R-QMV might lead one 
to assume otherwise. Instead the rules and sanctions operate as strong signalling mechanisms 
of what EU, especially euro, state macro-economic behaviour should be. Importantly, this is 
now backed up, as a result of changes from 2010, by much more intense knowledge 
production, multi-level monitoring and accountability mechanisms concerning states 
budgetary and economic policies.  Hence, rather than the introduction of a wide spread 
sanctions regime across the Economic regime of EU for Euro area states (Diagram 3) being the 
core of the transformation of EMU’s economic regime since the crisis, it is more centrally the 
changes which produce additional knowledge, such as the MIP (Diagram 2) and especially the 
oversight of national budgetary frameworks (Diagram 4) which have the potential to bring 
about deep changes in how national budgetary and economic policy-making is conducted. The 
sanctions largely serve the complementary function of underlining the seriousness of the 
policy commitments being agreed. Evidence for this reading could be found in the visible role 
already played by national independent fiscal bodies and the use by the Commission of its 
power to ask for national draft budgets to be amended. These show the real strength the new 
regime can have. It is also worth underlining the expansion of the new regime to accept new 
good reasons for departures from achieving numerical fiscal rules. Accepting such reasons has 
the benefit of making the number, absent any such reason, a much stronger normative 
statement. On this reading the comments by a range of European leaders that the application 
of the rules is appropriately underpinned by pragmatic or flexible intelligence is not so far off 
the mark.    
 
These three possible interpretations of the effectiveness of the Economic regime of EMU raise 
important agendas for assessing the current policy design and planning future policy in this 
field. 
 
 
 
 
